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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Office of the Executive Secretary

6 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence),
Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Deputy Director for Research,
Intelligence and Research, Department of State
[redacted] Chief of Staff,
Defense Intelligence Agency
[redacted] Deputy Assistant Director for
Production, National Security Agency
[redacted] Board of National
Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : State Department Comments Regarding Proposed
National Intelligence Objectives Committee

The attached paper by Mr. Evans regarding "A Priority
Committee - Arguments Pro and Con" is circulated for information
and discussion at the next meeting of the PNIO Review Committee.

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[redacted]
Executive Secretary, USIB

Attachment

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

April 29, 1963

Dear

Thinking over our last session, it occurred to me that it might be useful to put down the points we made in orderly fashion. I think I have covered the arguments that were presented; the fact that our contra statements come out pretty vigorously against the proposal will be no surprise to those who were at the meeting.

Sincerely,

Allan

Allan Evans

Deputy Director for Research
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Attachment:

"A Priorities Committee -
Arguments Pro and Con"
(SECRET), Cys 1 & 2.

Executive Secretary,
United States Intelligence Board,
Washington, D. C.

A National Intelligence Objectives Committee (NIOC) is needed because:

1. No one checks up on implementation of PNIOs

But: a - USIB has only to order the action agencies to report at some specific date or dates on what they have done or planned

b - Drafters of PNIOs could help by making clear where action is needed by identifying the changes in each new list

2. USIB could not needle the agencies or digest their reports

But: the community Coordinating Staff exists as an ideal center to perform this staff work for USIB

3. A GAP exists between the PNIO substantive level and present technical implementing collection organizations

But: a - This famous and much touted gap is a figment, because in each present organization (e.g., SIGINT Committee, NIS Committee, COMOR) the personnel deal day by day with substantive analysts in their own agencies, and the judgments they bring to the meetings combine estimative and technical considerations.

b - To the extent the technical groups operate out of touch with substance, it is the fault of the several agency heads, and should be discussed at USIB -- a NIOC would not cure this dangerous flaw.

c - Were NIOC to take up these several approaches, it would grow unwieldily large.

4. PNIOs should be kept up to date by some group

But: a - PNIOs are to have at least one year's validity (it was 3 to 5 years when we started). Thus PNIOs are not current intelligence indicators, and are not competing

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with Watch, CIB, etc., and do not require month to month or even quarter to quarter revision.

- b - In any case, PNIOs are not restrictive, and our intelligence structure has other means of meeting interim novelties -- notably the NIE procedures which have well proven their capability to deal with priority emergencies.
- c - The positive virtue of PNIOs is that they result from a comprehensive review of the total world situation; this overall review would get lost if PNIOs came to derive from a running and piecemeal concern with crises as they arise.
- d - The utility of PNIOs is generally seen as pointing (largely for budgetary planning purposes or post-factum justification) at large regional or even continental shifts of emphasis, and the number of items is being reduced, their scope generalized, accordingly. Continuous surveillance and modification conflict with this purpose, especially in that they would produce the same exhaustive detail and inclusiveness from which we are trying to escape.

5. Some center is required where all collection resources can be considered simultaneously

But: This center already exists in the CCPC. All we need is that USIB assign to CCPC for action the list of changes in priority which it accepts as valid when it approves each new PNIO list.

6. Rational allocation of assets and resources requires some central coordinating point

But: a - PNIOs do not pretend to deal with the full range of intelligence objectives and hence the full range of resources -- each list deals only with priority objectives, and for the community to limit its efforts to these objectives would produce catastrophe. What specific assets, then, would the NIOC have to play with? To determine the share of effort for which NIOC should feel responsible would occupy an army of lawyers for untold years and use up scads of the assets, time, and patience we should put on better things.

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b - If the intent (as clearly stated in the "Mission") is to review the total programs of the community, priority or otherwise, then we must seriously consider how this function may impinge upon the responsibilities of agency heads.

7. The powers proposed for NIOC are not really very extensive

But: Aside from the all-engrossing proposed "Mission" as above, the committee's function is specifically to "make recommendations to USIB regarding the practical implications of the PNIOs for national intelligence collection and production programs." Now, practical implications must mean action; collection and production programs mean everything we do (everything we do, incidentally; is "national," so no limitation resides in that word); and recommendations direct to USIB are words of power. It seems that the functions are indeed quite extensive and implement the mission in full.

AE
INR/DDR:AEvans:th:4/29/63.

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Original passed to [redacted] along with Mr. Chinn's request that he do the next redraft for the PIR Committee.

April 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

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SUBJECT : PNIOs

Not knowing quite how to address this memo, I send it to you in hopes that you will be so good as to forward it to whoever is wrestling with the job of polishing what are momentarily called CNIOs. I had two specific comments on Tab A that was before our recent meeting, and here they are for what they may be worth.

It seems to me that b and c coincide almost completely. The difference between "cold war crises" and "approaching East-West confrontations" seems hardly to justify two separate items at this rarefied height of generality.

(Even d treads closely upon this same area of confrontation)

In exchange for thus suggesting a cut in the list, I put forward the thought that quite high priority crises could occur, the nature of which could only by unjustified stretching be related to E-W matters. The "white redoubt" problem in southern Africa is certainly one. Obviously a crisis in that connection would open opportunities to the comrades, but for the US it would have vital connotations relating to the continent of Africa (to say nothing of domestic politics) which merit separate notice. In short, the world is not yet wholly polarized, and we need some CNIO (assuming we have any) that will direct our attention to earliest possible analysis of major areas of internal or international tension which may confront the US with the need or opportunity for action involving serious dilemmas and weighty consequences.

Allan Evans
Deputy Director for Research

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